Tax morale in Australia : what shapes it and has it changed over time?

Why taxpayers pay their taxes voluntarily is an important question for tax administrations worldwide. Some believe it is because taxpayers are deterred from tax evasion out of a fear of being caught or penalized. Others, in contrast, suggest that factors such as the level of tax morale one has (ie, the intrinsic motivation one has to pay their tax) affects compliance behaviour. While there have been numerous empirical studies published that have explored the role of deterrence on tax compliance behaviour, very few studies have explored the concept of tax morale in any detail. This article therefore attempts to rectify this gap in the literature. If tax morale is important in determining compliance behaviour, as several researchers have suggested, then it is also important to understand what might affect one’s level of tax morale. The specific aim of this article will be to identify factors that shape or have an impact on tax morale. Using data collected from the Australian waves of the 1981 and 1995 World Values Survey, this study will demonstrate that factors such as trust and moral beliefs plan an important role in shaping tax morale in Australia. Further, it will be shown that tax morale has increased significantly in Australia since the early 1980s, and that it has done so at a faster rate than many other OECD countries. Possible explanations for this increase will be discussed.

Optimal tax mix with merit goods

This paper deals with optimal taxation in a two‐class economy with two private commodities and labour. We derive optimal non‐linear income and linear commodity taxes in the presence of merit goods. We formulate merit good arguments via a pathology of individual choice. We assume weak separability between consumption and leisure and show how the standard optimal tax results are modified due to merit good considerations.

The tax treatment of employee stock options : generous to a fault

In the 2000 budgets, both the federal and Ontario governments introduced changes to the tax treatment of employee stock options for the explicit purpose of making their tax treatment in Canada similar to or more favourable than that in the United States. The federal budget added a deferral, similar to that currently applicable to options granted by Canadian-controlled private corporations, for up to $100,000 per year of public company stock options. The Ontario budget introduced an exemption from tax for employees involved in research and development on the first $100,000 per year of employee benefits arising on the exercise of qualified stock options or on eligible capital gains arising from the sale of shares acquired by the exercise of eligible stock options. These proposals reflect the apparent acceptance by the two governments that there is a “brain drain” from Canada to the United States of knowledge workers in the “new” economy and that reductions in Canadian taxes should stem this drain. In the author’s view, the tax treatment of employee stock options, even without these changes, is overly generous. Both the federal and provincial proposals ignore the fact that most employee stock options are taxed more favourably in Canada than in the United States in any event. In particular, most employee stock option benefits in Canada are taxed at capital gains tax rates, whereas in the United States most are taxed at full rates. While the US Internal Revenue Code does provide capital gains tax treatment for certain employee stock option benefits, a number of preconditions must be met. Most important, the shares acquired pursuant to the options must be held for a minimum of one year after the option is exercised. In addition, there are monetary limits on the amount of options that qualify for capital gains treatment. In Canada, there are generally no holding period requirements or monetary limits that apply in order for the option holder to benefit from capital gains tax rates. Empirical evidence indicates that the vast majority of employees in the United States exercise their options and immediately sell the shares acquired. These “cashless exercises” do not benefit from capital gains treatment in the United States, whereas similar cashless exercises in Canada generally do. This empirical evidence suggests not only that the 2000 budget proposals are unwarranted, but also that the existing treatment of employee stock options in Canada is already more generous than that in the United States. This article begins with a theoretical “benchmark” for the taxation of employee stock options. The author suggests that employee stock options should be treated in the same manner as other income from employment. In theory, the value of the benefit should be included in income when the option is granted or vests. However, owing to the practical difficulty of valuing employee stock options, the theoretical benchmark proposed is that the value of the benefit (the difference between the fair market value of the shares acquired and the strike price under the option) be taxed when the shares are acquired, and the employer be entitled to a corresponding deduction. The employee stock option rules in Canada and the United States are then compared and contrasted with each other and the benchmark treatment. The article then examines the arguments that have been made for favourable treatment of employee stock options. Included in this critique is a review of the recent empirical work on the Canadian brain drain. Empirical studies suggest that the brain drain—if it exists at all—is small and that, despite what many newspapers and right-wing think-tanks would have us believe, lower taxes in the United States are not the cause. One study, concluding that taxes do have an effect on migration, suggests that even if Canada adopted a tax system identical to that in the United States, the brain drain would be reduced by a mere 10 percent. Indeed, even if Canada eliminated income tax altogether, it would not stop the brain drain. If governments here want to spend money in order to stem the brain drain, they should focus on other areas. For example, Canada produces fewer university graduates in the fields of mathematics, sciences, and engineering than any other G7 country except Italy. The short supply of university graduates in these fields, the apparent loss of top-calibre academics to US
universities, and the consequent lower levels of university research in these areas (an important spawning ground for new ideas in the “new” knowledge-based economy) suggest that Canada may be better served by devoting more resources to its university institutions, particularly in post-graduate programs, rather than continuing the current trend of budget cuts that universities have endured and may further endure if taxes are reduced.
As far as employee stock options are concerned, if Canada does want to look to the United States for guidance on tax reform (which it seems to do with increasing frequency of late), it should adopt the US rules applicable to nonstatutory options, which are close to the proposed benchmark treatment. In the absence of preferential tax treatment, employee stock options would still be included in compensation packages provided that there were sound business reasons for their use. No persuasive evidence has been put forward that the use of stock options, in the absence of tax incentives, is suboptimal. Indeed, the US experience suggests quite the opposite.

Tax incentives for foreign direct investment part II : Design considerations

Part I of this article concluded that tax incentives for foreign direct investment (FDI) have become increasingly common over the past 10 years or so, especially among developing countries, and that there is substantial evidence to support the proposition that tax considerations now play an important role in many investment decisions. Countries seeking to attract FDI often feel compelled to offer tax inducements that are at least as attractive as those offered by their neighbours or competitors. Countries do so at a cost, however, and that cost may be substantial. Governments are thus placed in a dilemma - can they afford to cut taxes in order to attract investment, and can they afford not to? The second part of this article assumes that countries, and especially most developing countries, will continue to feel obliged to provide tax incentives. The aim of this part therefore is to examine ways in which those incentives can be made more effective and more efficient, thereby reducing their cost to the host country.

Tax incentives for foreign direct investment part I : Recent trends and countertrends

According to the conventional wisdom, tax incentives for investment - in particular for foreign direct investment (FDI) - are not recommended. That is the view held almost universally by theorists and by the international bodies that advise on tax matters.' Tax incentives are bad in theory and bad in practice. They are bad in theory principally because they cause distortions: investment decisions are made that would not have been made without the inducement of special tax concessions. They are bad in practice, being both ineffective and inefficient. They are ineffective in that tax considerations are only rarely a major determinant in FDI decisions; they are inefficient because their cost, in terms of tax revenue foregone, often far exceeds any benefits they may produce. Other criticisms are also frequently levelled against tax incentives for FDI - they are inequitable (since they benefit some investors but not others), they are difficult to administer and open to abuse, and they lack transparency. Thus, it is not surprising that ''the standard advice given by institutions like the World Bank and the lMF to developing countries is to refrain from offering tax incentives to foreign investors".2 The purpose of this article is not to question that advice or to challenge the conventional wisdom - except in one respect. Recent evidence does suggest that tax considerations are an increasingly important factor in investment decisions and that special tax incentives have become substantially more effective as instruments for attracting FDI than they were 10 or 20 years ago.3 The first part of this article, published here, examines some of that evidence, reviews some recent trends in national policies towards FDI, attempts to suggest why investment incentives have become more important and more effective, and looks at the pressures that are exerted on governments, especially in developing countries, to compete for FDI by offering special incentives. The second part of the article, to be published in the Bulletin next month, assumes that many countries will continue to offer tax incentives to investors regardless of the best advice, and considers how incentives might be designed in order to increase their effectiveness and efficiency.

Exempt treatment of financial intermediation services under a value-added tax: an assessment of alternatives

Most countries with a value-added tax (VAT) exempt financial intermediation services from the tax. While exemption is generally perceived to be undesirable, it is also widely regarded as unavoidable because of technical difficulties in applying VAT to these services. This article reviews the standard rationale for exempt treatment and then considers the relative merits of two recent challenges raised in the tax literature. The first challenge involves the application of cash flow taxation to financial intermediation services in a manner that is consistent with an invoice/credit VAT (which is the dominant form). The second challenge proposes a comprehensive system of zero-rating of financial intermediation services, which is supported by a characterization of the household consumption of such services as non-taxable. The author argues that each of these alternatives to an exemption system suffers from both theoretical and practical implementation difficulties that make maintenance of exempt treatment the preferred approach, at least in the short term. There is, however, a simpler alternative to these fundamental reform options, involving modification of just one aspect of an exemption system to relieve some of its more problematic aspects. Many of the interpretative problems and associated inefficiencies that plague an exemption system arise from the need to distinguish between taxable and exempt financial services. The author argues that these difficulties can be eliminated, to a large extent, by basing the distinction on the form of prices. In support of this approach, he points out that it is consistent with the underlying reasons for the application of exempt treatment. The author considers a number of other possible modifications, but these are either rejected outright or viewed with a healthy skepticism. For example, the author is critical of the apparent rationale for the application of cash flow taxation to property and casualty insurers. He also rejects proposals that accept some looseness in the formulaic allocation by financial intermediaries of the costs of business inputs between exempt and taxable services for input credit purposes. In his view, an explicit reliance on pricing structures to draw the boundary between exempt and taxable services is preferable to the provision of relief for blocked input tax credits of financial intermediaries. Finally, the author is skeptical of the case for a policy response intended to address the tax bias under an exemption system for financial intermediaries to insource supplies.

Impact of the new business tax system (alienation of personal services income) Act 2000

The implications of categorising income as "personal services income" and the actual meaning of this term have been marked with uncertainty. The Commissioner of Taxation has long asserted that "personal services income" inherently may not be derived by an entity other than the person whose exertions produce the income. In Liedig v FCT (1994) 28 ATR 141, however, Hill J held that in the absence of a specific legislative provision, there was no basis for the Commissioner's doctrine. The specific legislative measures Hill J required were put in place through the New Business Tax System (Alienation of Personal Services Income) Act 2000. In certain circumstances this Act prevents interposed entities from deriving personal services income. Such payments are attributed instead to the individual who performs the services.

It will also be seen, however, that these provisions do not apply to entities that are conducting a "personal services business". It is submitted that the combined effect of, inter alia, the Act's definition of "personal services income" and "personal services business" is to give the Act a narrower scope than the Commissioner's personal services doctrine. Moreover, it will be submitted that the statutory definition of personal services income also suffers from the same flaws that Hill J identified as relevant to the Commissioner's personal services doctrine.

The use of correspondence analysis to develop a scale to measure workplace morale from multi-level data

This paper focuses on the issue of comparing social groups or collectivities using measures derived from individual-level multivariate data. In this case, groups need to be differentiated such that: (a) between-group differences are maximized; (b) within-group differences are minimised; and (c) `differences' are calibrated to a scale that reflects a set indicators or observed variables.This paper demonstrates empirically how correspondence analysis can achieve this. It presents a scale of `workplace morale' derived from the responses of employees in a large sample of workplaces to questions concerning satisfaction with various facets of their job and their workplace. The scale derived through correspondence analysis is shown to achieve the three criteria described above.

Response : A defensible and workable approach to the income tax treatment of financial instruments

It is a privilege to have the opportunity to respond to the comments on my monograph1 provided by Mark Gergen, Glenn May, and Gordon Longhouse. Their comments, which are inevitably coloured by their very different perspectives, reflect the considerable expertise that each one of them has in the area of the income taxation of financial instruments. Indeed, it is with some hesitation that I offer a response in defence of various portions of the analysis presented in my monograph in support of some pretty modest proposals in this extremely difficult area of income tax law. Although I spent considerable time exploring some necessary first principles and their implications for the design of a system for the income taxation of financial instruments, I made several concessions to certain practical constraints that led me to support, in some measure, the status quo reflected in certain of the existing literature, as well as the legislation in a select group of countries. On the assumption that many readers may be unfamiliar with the monograph, I propose to respond by outlining much of my analysis in the monograph and the proposals that are the logical outcome. Throughout the outline, I will highlight and respond to what I see as the important points of difference emphasized by Gergen, May, and Longhouse.

Taming Complexity in Australian Income Tax

Taxpayers and tax authorities recognise that complex Australian income tax law is in need of simplification - during the past decade there have been two ineffective attempts at simplification of the tax law - first by redrafting the law in plain English without addressing structural issues - second by the proposed wholesale replacement of the legislation with a new foundation, incorporating most of the causes of the complexity in the current law - with tax law growing in size and complexity, new paths to simplification must be considered.